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Blockchain is a decentralized and peer-to-peer ledger technology that adds trans-
parency, traceability, and immutability to data. It has shown great promise in mit-
igating the interoperability problem and privacy concerns in the de facto electronic
health record management systems and has recently received increasing attention
from the healthcare industry. Several blockchain-based and decentralized health data
management mechanisms have been proposed to improve the quality of care delivery
to patients. Apart from care delivery, health data has other important applications,
such as education, regulation, research, public health improvement, and policy sup-
port. However, existing privacy acts prohibit health institutions and providers from
sharing patients’ data with third parties. Therefore, research institutions that con-
duct research on private health data need a secure system that provides accurate
analysis results while preserving patient privacy and minimizing the risks of data
breaches. In this thesis, We propose a novel privacy-preserving method for statis-
tical analysis of health data. We leveraged the blockchain technology and Paillier
encryption algorithm to increase the accuracy of data analysis while preserving the
privacy of patients. Smart contracts were used to carry out mathematical operations
on the encrypted records in a secure manner. We were able to successfully deploy the
proposed scheme on Hyperledger Fabric, a permissioned and consortium blockchain
platform. Compared to the previous works, the proposed model enjoys the benefits
of a distributed blockchain-based environment, which include higher availability and
enhanced data security. The experimental results show the feasibility of this method
with a reasonable amount of time for regular queries.
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Statistical analysis of health data is an important task in healthcare. However, ex-
isting healthcare systems are incompatible with this important need due to privacy
restrictions. A recently emerged technology called Blockchain has shown a great
promise mitigating this incompatibility. This thesis aims to improve existing statis-
tical analysis protocols by leveraging the blockchain technology. We propose a novel
method that enables researchers to conduct statistical analysis on health data in a
privacy-preserving, secure and precise manner.
In this chapter, we review the terminology and main concepts we are using in this the-
sis. The concepts include Statistical Analysis, Permissioned Blockchain, and Paillier
Cryptosystem.
1.1 Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis is the science of collecting and interpreting numerical data for
the purpose of identifying underlying patterns and making a more effective decision.
It has many usages in healthcare [2]. Table 1.1.1 shows some example usages of




Researchers Generating Reports, Research & Development
Government and Law makers Regulation, Public Health Status Analysis
Physicians Decision Supporting
Hospitals, Health Providers Policy Making, Performance Improvement
Patients Self health management
Table 1.1.1: Statistic Analysis Usages in Healthcare
1.2 Blockchain
Blockchain is the technology behind Bitcoin that enables this crypto-currency to
validate transactions without the need for a trusted third-party.
1.2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin [39] is the first and largest decentralized digital currency and online payment
system. It was introduced in 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto and replaced central banks
with computer nodes running worldwide to validate transactions. Bitcoin is based
on proof, instead of trust, and operates without any trusted third-party in a fully
distributed environment.
1.2.2 Blockchain Structure
Blockchain is a growing list of records (blocks) that are linked together using cryp-
tography. Each block contains some data (such as financial transactions or medical
records), a timestamp, hash of the previous block, and hash of its data. As an excep-
tion, the first block in a blockchain (Genesis Block) does not have a previous block
hash.
Since blocks are linked using hash values, even a small change in the contents of one
2
1. INTRODUCTION
block changes the hash of that block and invalidates all the following blocks. Figure
1.2.3 illustrates the result of data manipulation in a blockchain data structure.
Fig. 1.2.1: Simple Blockchain Structures
The unique structure of blockchains provides some important features:
• Distributed: Every node in a blockchain network maintains a copy of the
shared ledger. Therefore, there is not a single point of failure in the network,
and the network becomes more stable.
• Secure: Every node validates data prior to adding it to the ledger, separately.
• Immutable & Transparent: The history of all data modifications will be per-




• Programmable: Computer programs (Smart Contracts) can be used to en-
force terms of a contract in a blockchain network instead of trusted third-parties.
A blockchain is made of various technologies. Here we list the most critical technolo-
gies used in a blockchain network:
• Node Connection: Blockchain networks have a distributed architecture. In
a blockchain network, nodes are connected using Peer to Peer communication
protocols, e.g., BitTorrent [1].
• Data Protection: Hash algorithms like MD5 [43] are used to protect data
against manipulation.
• User Authentication and Transaction Validation: Asymmetric cryptog-
raphy and digital signature algorithms are utilized to authenticate users, and
verify the integrity of transactions. Example algorithms are: RSA [45], and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography [38].
• Adding New Blocks: Nodes in a blockchain network use consensus algo-
rithms to reach a consensus on adding a new block to the blockchain. Example
consensus algorithms used in blockchain networks are Proof of Work [56], Proof
of Stake [55], Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [22].
1.2.3 Blockchain Types
Many derivations of blockchain technology have been introduced since its emergence
in 2008. We can categorize them based on two factors:
• Anonymity of Validators: The nodes in a blockchain network that val-
idate transactions are called validators. In a blockchain network, validators
are either public or private. Blockchain networks with public validators allow
public computers to join their network and validate transactions. On the other
side, private or federated blockchain networks require computer nodes to ob-
tain necessary certificates defined by the protocol before joining the network.
4
1. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin [39] and Ethereum [57] are two popular cryptocurrencies with a public
blockchain structure and Hyperledger Fabric [15] is an example of a private
blockchain.
• Trust in Validators: Trust in validators are either permissioned or permis-
sionless. In a permissionless blockchain, the assumption is that everybody is
potentially corrupt; therefore, the nodes use proof-based consensus algorithms
instead of trust-based ones. However, proof-based consensus algorithms are
time-consuming and consume a considerable amount of energy. On the other
side, permissioned blockchains distribute the trust among a preselected set of
participants to achieve a higher scalability rate. For example, Bitcoin is a per-
missionless blockchain, and Ethereum Casper is a permissioned blockchain.
Figure 1.2.2 illustrates various types of blockchains, examples of their consensus al-
gorithms and their implementations categorized based on the two factors mentioned
above.
Fig. 1.2.2: Blockchain Types









































































































































































































































































Smart Contracts are computerized versions of traditional contracts. They are a set
of procedures defined by the blockchain network designer to process inputs and alter
data stored on the distributed ledger once specific conditions defined by contract
writers are met. With smart contracts, a computer program enforces the contract
without the interference of any third-parties.
To create a smart contract, several parties agree on the terms of a contract. Then,
they include the smart contract in a transaction and submit it to the blockchain
network. Once the smart contract is added to the blockchain, the contract will be
automatically triggered once specified terms in the contract are met.
Fig. 1.2.3: A Smart Contract Submitted to A Blockchain Network
Some advantages of smart contracts are:
• Fraud reduction
• Arbitration and enforcement cost reduction




Hyperledger is an open-source collaborative effort from leaders in finance, banking,
internet of things, supply chains, manufacturing, and technology for the goal of ad-
vancing cross-industry blockchain technologies and was first started in 2015. Linux
Foundation hosts the project, but the project has received contributions from IBM,
Intel, and SAP. Hyperledger incubates a range of business blockchain technologies,
such as Hyperledger Fabric, Hyperledger Sawtooth, and Hyperledger Composer.
1.2.5.1 Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric is a modular and extensible open-source framework for deploy-
ing and operating private and permissioned blockchains. It provides confidentiality,
flexibility, resiliency, and scalability and is one of the Hyperledger projects hosted
by the Linux Foundation. Hyperledger Fabric supports smart contracts (also called
chaincodes), configurable consensus, and membership services. It supports chaincodes
written in Go and JavaScript language and has components for supporting other lan-
guages such as Java and Ethereum’s Solidity language [5]. Due to its modular design,
enterprise support, open-source environment, and support for several popular pro-
gramming languages, it is potentially more flexible than its competitors like Corda
and Quorum.
In Hyperledger Fabric, nodes can join multiple channels. Upon joining a channel,
they receive an exact copy of the channel’s ledger and continuously maintain the
same view of the ledger. In this case, preserving the privacy participants in chan-
nels is a challenge. Particularly when the nodes are competitors or when they deal
with sensitive data, e.g., health providers. We address this challenge using Paillier
Cryptosystem, which will be described in the next section.
1.2.5.2 Hyperledger Composer
Hyperledger Composer is a set of tools for designing, deploying and testing business
networks for Hyperledger Fabric. Hyperledger Composer is written in the JavaScript
8
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programming language and provides libraries for editors to have a convenient develop-
ment environment. Hyperledger Composer abstracts away the complexity of creating
business networks by offering a component-based solution in forms of a business net-
work package (Figure 1.2.4).
A business network is consist of participants, assets, transactions, access control rules,
events, and queries which are defined separately in several files:
• Model File (.cto): Modeling files written in Hyperledger Modeling Language
[9] that contain definitions of all participants, assets, transactions, and events
in the business network.
• Transaction Logic (logic.js): This file contains transaction processor func-
tions that trigger whenever a transaction is called.
• Access Control (permissions.acl): A file that contains basic rules for con-
trolling the access of users to the resources. Advanced access controls can be
defined by adding a ”permissionHelper.js” file to the package. With this addi-
tional file, advanced access to resources can be programmatically defined.
• Query Definitions (queries.qry): This file contains definitions of custom
queries that are written in a SQL similar language (native query language).
These queries can filter results returned using specified conditions and be trig-
gered in transactions to perform operations such as updating or removing the
results.
After a business network archive (.bna) file is created, the package can be deployed




Fig. 1.2.4: Business Network Archive
1.3 Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC)
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) refers to a process where multiple participants
implement a joint computation without revealing information about the inputs and
without the help of any trusted party.
1.4 Paillier Cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem [41] is an asymmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm in-
troduced in 1999 by Pascal Paillier.
Asymmetric encryption algorithms have a pair of keys that contain a public key and
a private key. Messages are encrypted using the public key and can only be decrypted
using the private key (Figure 1.4.1).
Fig. 1.4.1: Asymmetric encryption
Algorithm 1.4.1 shows steps for generating a Paillier cryptosystem.
10
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Algorithm 1.4.1 Paillier Key Generation
Input: Prime numbers p, q, s.t. p 6= q, and gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1
Output: Public key (n, g), and private key (λ, µ)
1: n := pq
2: g := A random number s.t. g ∈ Z∗n2
3: λ := lcm(p− 1, q − 1)




After the generation of the keys, the encrypted form of plaintexts can be obtained
using Algorithm 1.4.2.
Algorithm 1.4.2 Paillier Message Encryption
Input: Public key (n, g), Plaintext m where 0 ≤ m < n
Output: Ciphertext c
1: r := A random number s.t. 0 < r < n, and r ∈ Z∗n2
2: c := gm × rn mod n2
Finally, algorithm 1.4.3 decrypts an encrypted message.
Algorithm 1.4.3 Paillier Message Decryption
Input: Private key (λ, µ), Ciphertext c
Output: Plaintext m




Two notable features of Paillier cryptosystem are:
• Probabilistic Encryption: This feature refers to the generation of a different
ciphertext for the same message every time the plaintext is encrypted.
• Homomorphic Encryption: Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryp-
tion that allows performing mathematical operations on plaintexts in their en-
crypted form. For example, in the Paillier cryptosystem, the addition of plain-
texts can be achieved using their ciphertexts.
Using the homomorphic property of Paillier, the production of two ciphertexts de-
crypts to the summation of their corresponding plaintexts. Algorithm 1.4.4 shows
the steps for calculating the homomorphic addition of two plaintexts.
11
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Algorithm 1.4.4 Paillier Homomorphic Addition
Input: Public key (n, g), Encryption function E, Ciphertexts c1, c2 of plaintexts
m1,m2, respectively.
Output: Encrypted summation of plaintexts: m1 +m2




2.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) has been an active research area for several
decades. Andrew Yao introduced this concept to the scientific community in 1982
in a problem that is known today as Yao’s Millionaires’ problem [58]. The problem
discusses two millionaires who wish to find out who is richer without revealing their
actual wealth. The solution involves the utilization of one-way functions in interactive
communications between the parties. Later, a more generalized solution was intro-
duced in another work by Yao in 1986 [59]. The work discussed the generation of a
random integer N = p.q such that its secret (p, q) is hidden from both parties individ-
ually but is recoverable jointly whenever needed. Yao also introduced workarounds for
secure computations between two parties. Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson followed
Yao’s works and introduced two, secure, multi-party computation methods in 1987
[29, 28]. Sheikh et al. [49] classified solutions for SMC problems into three categories:
Randomization, Anonymization, and Cryptographic.
2.1.1 Randomization Methods
Randomization is another method for performing secure multi-party computations
over private data. In this method, parties add random noises [54] or swap values
[32, 42] in their original datasets and form distorted datasets in order to protect their
private values. Randomization protocols deal with the trade-off between the precision
of computations and the security of private values in a database. These protocols try
13
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to maximize the accuracy of computations over distorted datasets while preserving
the confidentiality of private data. Cliftonet et al. [24] proposed a secure sum protocol
that allows multiple parties to compute the sum of their private data while keeping
the confidentiality of their private data. However, randomization protocols usually
increase the size of datasets and decrease the precision of computation results.
2.1.2 Anonymization Methods
Data de-identification is another method commonly used for performing secure com-
putations over private data. K-anonymity [52] is an example of this method, intro-
duced by Sweeney in 2002. This method derives the data set D′ from the original
data set D in a way that, for any attributes a in D there are at least k instances in
D′. An example of k-anonymity is shown in Table 2.1.1. However, anonymized or
pseudo-anonymized databases are prone to social engineering attacks. Ashwin et al.
[33] have identified two re-identification attacks against this method.
Table 2.1.1: K-anonymity Example
ID Zip Code Age Nationality Disease
1 E9A 0H7 19 Iranian Heart Disease
2 E9A 0H1 16 Romanian Diabetes
3 E9A 0D4 17 Chinese Heart Disease
4 E9A 0H2 13 Japanese Cancer
5 B3T 0H2 35 Brazilian HIV
6 B3T 0T2 33 Romanian HIV
7 B3T 0H1 31 Brazilian HIV
8 B3T 0D8 37 Chinese HIV
9 T1R 0H2 33 Iranian Diabetes
10 T1R 0B5 43 Iranian Heart Disease
11 T1R 0V2 53 Chinese Cancer
12 T1R 0E8 44 Brazilian Diabetes
(a) Private Dataset
ID Zip Code Age Nationality Disease
1 E9A *** < 20 * Heart Disease
2 E9A *** < 20 * Diabetes
3 E9A *** < 20 * Heart Disease
4 E9A *** < 20 * Cancer
5 B3T *** 3* * HIV
6 B3T *** 3* * HIV
7 B3T *** 3* * HIV
8 B3T *** 3* * HIV
9 T1R *** ≥ 30 * Diabetes
10 T1R *** ≥ 30 * Heart Disease
11 T1R *** ≥ 30 * Cancer





In [20], the authors proposed a method for supporting private data in a Hyperledger
Fabric channel. The proposed method requires modification of the underlying struc-
ture of Fabric’s network for adding two new components. As a showcase, the authors
implemented an auction application and stored encrypted reservations and bidding
values privately on the ledger. Their results showed a 0.3 s transaction execution
time. However, their method requires some clients to have access to the same pri-
vate keys that peers use for data encryption, which may raise some security concerns
and may not be suitable for the statistical analysis of health records. Compared to
our work, we do not require any modification in the underlying Hyperledger Fabric
structure and do not distribute the private key between the peers. Our method can
be plugged into existing blockchain applications and used instantly. The authors in
[48, 21, 46], proposed privacy-preserving techniques and protocols for securely com-
puting statistical analysis methods. However, their proposed protocols are highly
interactive and require many data exchanges between the participating parties. Our
work is an attempt to reduce this complexity by using the blockchain technology.
2.2 Blockchain Adoption in Healthcare
The efficiency of health data management systems has a significant impact on patient
care. However, existing health management systems suffer from lack of interoper-
ability, expensive implementation, maintenance, and security vulnerabilities [50, 11].
Studies have shown that blockchain technology has the potential to mitigate many of
these problems [31, 36]. A successful example is Estonia’s healthcare system that uses
blockchain to verify the integrity of medical records and access logs [4]. Following,
we briefly review some of the research works related to blockchain adoption in health
record management systems.
The authors in [17] proposed a blockchain-based and decentralized health records
management system called MedRec. They used a public blockchain that incentives
researchers to mine new blocks in exchange for getting access to anonymized medical
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data. The authors claimed that their proposed system increases transparency of
medical records, stability of the network, and confidentiality of data. This work was
later continued by the authors in [40]. The authors replaced miners with a network of
trusted providers that participate in a proof of authority consensus mechanism. They
used blockchain to store permission contracts. In their work, providers can join the
network and grant patients, and other entities access to their databases using their
credentials.
The authors in [37] used a federated and private blockchain to explore an auditable
identity and access management framework for EHR systems. Evaluation of their
system showed a size of 3.8 MB for initialization of the blockchain with 2-3 seconds
mining time for new transactions.
The authors in [23] presented an integration of a cloud and blockchain storage
scheme to manage PHR data. They used off-chain cloud storage for storing large
amounts of medical data and a blockchain for indexing and securing them. In their
work, patients are in control of their data. However, the interoperability of their
system is not examined.
The authors in [34] propose a framework for secure multiparty computation that
uses cloud computing and Paillier homomorphic encryption to protect the privacy of
patients.
In [12], the authors proposed an interactive model for a blockchain-based PHR
system. In the proposed system, smart contracts are utilized to collect patients’
health records, and blockchain technology is used to make transactions immutable
and traceable. The authors claimed that their approach encourages physicians to





In this chapter, the motivation and methodology will be discussed.
3.1 Motivation
Health data are sensitive information and have strict privacy rules. Privacy acts such
as HIPPA [13] restrict access to patients’ data sets and encourage healthcare providers
to maintain isolated databases. As these databases grow, they become less efficient
and secure, which makes health care services more expensive and less accessible to
the public.
A survey [51] conducted by Deloitte in 2018 from 624 physicians shows that interop-
erability is the top demand from physicians as 62 percent said that interoperability
in the current systems needs more improvements ( Figure 3.1.1).
Fig. 3.1.1: Interoperability Is the Top Demand from Physicians
However, a recently emerged technology called Blockchain has shown great promise
to mitigate this problem. Blockchain adoption in healthcare has received growing at-
tention from industry as well as academia. In industry, a survey [53] conducted by
17
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IBM from 200 executives shows 56% of participants expect to have a commercial
blockchain solution at scale by 2020. 3.1.3
Fig. 3.1.2: Commercial Adoption of Blockchain in Healthcare Survey
In academia, publications related to blockchain adoption in healthcare increased
from 5.56% in 2016 to 72.22% in 2018 [14].
Fig. 3.1.3: Publications Related to Blockchain Adoption in Healthcare
Many works have been proposed for privacy-preserving statistical analysis on
health data. However, they usually use a centralized solution to protect users’ identi-
ties. The models have a low service quality due to having a single point of failure. On
the other side, we saw that blockchain technology is expected to transform healthcare
management systems in the near future. In addition, healthcare data custodians are
often unable to provide researchers direct access to their data due to privacy concerns.
So, there is a need for a secure statistical analysis protocol that is compatible with the
characteristics of these new systems and provides researchers access to their desired
18
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data in blockchain networks.
In this work, we propose a privacy-preserving method to perform statistical anal-
ysis on health data in a distributed blockchain network.
3.2 Methodology
In our proposed framework, we use the blockchain technology to increase the trans-
parency, accessibility, and integrity of the data and the Paillier cryptosystem to pre-
serve the confidentiality of private data.
Our scheme is designed for a network with several data custodians and researchers.
We assume data custodians are joined in a blockchain network channel and maintain
a shared and distributed ledger. Additionally, researchers use APIs provided by the
network for data communications (Figure 3.2.1).
Fig. 3.2.1: A Sample Blockchain Network with 3 Organizations and 1 Researcher
The researchers send requests to the data custodians and ask them for the results
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of a specific query. The partial results of the query will be computed by each data cus-
todian and encrypted using the Paillier cryptosystem. Smart contracts are utilized to
compute the final result and preserve the privacy of the data. Data custodians can be
any organizations, like health providers, insurance companies and etc. In a blockchain
network, data custodians joined in the same channel are also maintainers of the ledger.
Thus, they can read data stored on the ledger. On the other side, researchers are the
end-users of the network, and their access to the ledger can be controlled using Access
Control Lists (ACLs). In our scheme, the researcher is expected to not reveal any data
to other parties.
3.2.1 Proposed Scheme
The method is consist of 6 steps (Figure 3.2.2) and proceeds as follows:
Step 1: The first step contains tasks that should be carried out by the researcher:
Step 1.a: The researcher sets up a Paillier Cryptographic system with a pri-
vate key SKr and public key PKr
Step 1.b: The researcher stores the private key SKr in a secure database
Step 1.c: The researcher submits a proposal to the blockchain network for
a new query. The proposal contains the description of the query,
public key PKr, and operation to be executed on the query results
of data custodians to achieve the final result.
Step 2: A smart contract will create a new asset for the requested method.
Step 3: All data custodians will calculate the variables for the requested query, en-
crypt the values with the public key PKr, and submit the encrypted values
to the blockchain network.
Step 4: A smart contract will be executed to aggregate the encrypted variables and
store the final result. This smart contract uses the homomorphic properties
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Fig. 3.2.2: Architecture of the Proposed Scheme
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of the Paillier cryptosystem to calculate the final result. It will store the en-
crypted result on the blockchain that can be only decrypted using the private
key of the researcher (SKr).
Step 5: The final variables are ready and will be provided to the researcher.
Step 6: The researcher gets the values, decrypts them and uses them to calculate the
associated statistical method function.
We demonstrated how the proposed scheme could be used to jointly calculate a
statistical method and transfer its value to the researcher securely. All query results
will be securely encrypted using the researcher’s public key and then stored on the
ledger. Therefore, encrypted data on the ledger is only decryptable by the researcher.
Also, the researcher’s access privileges can be restricted to specific values using ACLs,
so the privacy of data custodians will be preserved.
Next, we show how some statistical functions can be securely calculated using the
proposed method.
3.2.2 Secure Count
Count is a simple statistical function that represents the number of instances in a
dataset.
Calculating count using our proposed method consists of two steps:
1. Each data owner calculates and encrypts the number of instances in their dataset
and submits the result to the blockchain.
2. A smart contract will aggregate the encrypted values from each data owner and
store the result on the blockchain.




Using these three simple steps, the data user receives the total number of instances
without getting any knowledge about the actual number of instances within each
organization. The count function has only one variable, which is the total number of
instances. However, some statistical functions have more than one variable. A similar
approach is used to calculate more functions with more calculations.
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Homomorphic Addition: N
Table 3.2.1: Shares of Data for Secure Count
3.2.3 Secure Mean
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Homomorphic Addition: A N
Shares of Data for Secure Mean
Then, smart contracts aggregate the shares, denoted with A (Equation 3), and
N (Equation 4), using Paillier homomorphic properties and provide the aggregated











N = E(n1)× E(n2)× · · · × E(ni) (4)
Next, the data user decrypts the aggregated results and receives the sum of x and n
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D(N) = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ ni (6)






In this section, we use a similar approach to the previous section to securely compute
variance of a distributed dataset.






































































































j=1(x1,j − x1)2 +
∑n2
j=1(x2,j − x2)2 + · · ·+
∑ni
j=1(xi,j − xi)2
n1 + n2 + · · ·+ ni
(10)
Next, we define three variables, A, B, and N as shown in equations 11, 12, 13, re-










N = E(n) (13)
Table 1 summarizes variables that i data owners (denoted with D) need to cal-

























Homomorphic Addition: A B N
Shares of Data for Secure Variance
After all organizations submitted their values to blockchain, a smart contract will
aggregate similar variables using Paillier homomorphic addition property and put the
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results on blockchain. Next, the data user reads and decrypts the value of variables









Skewness is a statistical method that shows the degree of assymetry of a distribution.
Skewness can be calculated using expression 15 where σ is the standard deviation






We expand this expression to change its form and make it suitable for a distributed











































Based on expression 15, data owners need to calculate and securely share three values.
































Homomorphic Addition: A B N
Table 3.2.3: Shares of Data for Secure Skewness
Steps to securely calculate skewness are:
1. The data user securely calculates the mean (µ) and variance (σ2) values based
on the previous sections.








i , and n in their private
datasets, encrypt the values and submit them to the blockchain network.
3. A smart contract securely aggregates the submitted values using Paillier Ho-
momorphic addition property, and stores the final values (A, B and N) on the
blockchain.
4. The data user recieves the final values, decrypts them and calculates the final









A similar approach as the previous schemes can be used to calculate more statistical
methods. For example, secure protocols proposed for Bivariate Analysis [46], Cor-





The time required by the proposed method to perform a secure multiparty compu-
tation task mainly depends on the number of participating organizations and the
secure method in which they aim to compute securely. The proposed secure methods
have different numbers of variables. So, if we denote the number of variables with α
and the number of participating organizations with n, the computation cost for the
proposed algorithm will be:
Computation cost = α ∗ n
These computations will be performed by a smart contract that uses the homo-
morphic addition property of Paillier cryptosystem to aggregate the partial variables,
which has a complexity of O(n) where n is the number of encrypted messages.
In addition, before the aggregation of the partial variables, the parties need to
set up their own Paillier cryptosystem, encrypt their values and submit them to the
blockchain network. However, these local computations could be performed once by
each organization and in parallel. Therefore, they are negligible compared with the
other computational costs, and we have not considered them. This also applies to
the generation of the Paillier public key and decryption of the final value by the data
user.
Finally, this complexity is in addition to the complexity added by the consensus
protocol of the blockchain network, which differs based on the type of the blockchain
and its study is beyond the purpose of this paper.
3.4 Method Comparison
Following, we discuss some of the important features of the proposed method com-
pared to the related works. A summary of the comparison is provided in table 3.4.1.
1. Auditability: The consensus protocol in a blockchain network, ensures that
only authorized transactions are committed to the distributed ledger. Transac-
tions are logged and timestamped and stored on the ledger in forms of blocks.
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So, the records are transparent and traceable. Therefore, any malicious activity,
data manipulation, and illegal transactions will be easily detected.
2. Flexibility: We have implemented our method on Hyperledger Fabric, which
is supported by giant tech companies such as IBM and SAP. The open-source
and cross-platform features of Hyperledger Fabric provide data providers higher
flexibility for adopting this solution.
3. Availability: As data are redundant between the peer nodes in a blockchain
network, there is not a single point of failure in such networks, and users enjoy
a higher data availability.
4. Identity Management: Hyperledger Fabric provides native APIs to control
access to the resources. The access to resources can be regulated using Access
Control Lists (ACL) or in more sophisticated cases using scripts. The peer
nodes enforce the access control rules and ensure that only authorized users
have access to the resources.
5. Data Privacy: We use the Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt confidential mes-
sages. In case an attacker gets access to the data stored on the blockchain, the
attacker will not be able to read any of the query results as they are encrypted
with the private key of the data user.
6. Independent: The proposed method does not rely on the addition of any




Features [21] [25] [34] [20] Proposed Method
Availability N N Y Y Y
Decentralized N N N Y Y
Identity Management N Y Y Y Y
Data Immutability N N N Y Y
Data Auditability N N N Y Y
Flexibility Y N Y Y Y
Protected Private Key Y Y Y N Y
Independent Y Y Y N Y
Targeted Usage Y Y Y N Y
Table 3.4.1: Comparison of the Proposed Method with Similar Works
3.5 Implementation
Several tools have been used during our implementations which will be discussed in
this section.
3.5.0.1 Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric is an open-source permissioned blockchain platform developed by
IBM and Linux Foundation. We used this platform to create our blockchain network.
3.5.0.2 Hyperledger Composer
Hyperledger Composer is an open-source framework to design, test and deploy busi-
ness models for blockchain applications on Hyperledger Fabric. We used this frame-
work to design our blockchain-based business model.




Fig. 3.5.1: Business Network Definitions
3.5.0.3 Composer REST Server
In order to communicate with the blockchain network on HTTP protocol, Hyperledger
Composer REST Server [6] was used to generate a REST API from the deployed
blockchain business network.
Figure 3.5.2 shows the running REST Server for our proposed model.




We evaluated the performance of our proposed method to show its viability in a
distributed environment. The performance is evaluated by studying the latency of
secure multiparty computations in various configurations.
4.1 Experiment Variables
There are two classes of variables in every experiment, dependent variables, and
independent variables. The values of dependent variables depend on the values of
independent variables. Response time of servers (RT) is usually considered as the
bottleneck of blockchain applications, so we used this variable as the dependent vari-
able. This variable describes the average amount of time that it takes for clients to
receive a response after sending their requests to the servers.
4.1.1 Independent Variables
We have identified the following independent variables in our proposed method:
• Key Size: Key size in cryptosystems like Paillier is one of the important factors
that determine how fast that cryptosystem runs. There is a trade-off between
the key size and how secure the key is. Smaller keys run faster, but they are
more prone to brute-force attacks.
• Statistical Analysis Method: Statistical analysis methods in our proposed
scheme have different numbers of variables. For example, to compute the Mean
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method, two variables are to be computed by the parties. But for Variance,
there are three variables. More variables result in more computations for the
blockchain nodes.
• Request Type: There are two types of requests in a Hyperledger Fabric API,
GET requests and POST requests. GET requests refer to requests that read
data from the distributed ledger. These kinds of requests do not commit any
changes on the ledger and therefore run faster. Conversely, POST requests are
used for submitting transactions that modify the ledger. POST requests require
reaching consensus among the blockchain nodes, and therefore they take a longer
time to process.
• Number of Organizations: Our proposed algorithm works in a distributed
environment, and each organization shares its part of computations. Increasing
the number of organizations means more calculations and is expected to increase
the overall execution time.
4.2 System Configuration
During the experiments, we used the following described system as the server (Table
4.2.1).
Operating System Mac OS Cataline v10.15 Beta
Computer Model MacBook Pro (13-inch, 2017)
Processor 3.5 GHz Intel Core i7
Memory 16 GB 2133 MHz LPDDR3
Container Platform Docker
Table 4.2.1: System Specifications
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4.3 Experiments
In the following experiments, we use each one of the abovementioned cases as the
independent variable and consider the response time of the blockchain network as
the dependent variable. We communicate with the blockchain network using a REST
API provided by Hyperledger Composer. The REST API connects to a Hyperledger
Fabric blockchain network and communicates with the clients using HTTP requests.
4.3.1 Key Size
We used four different key sizes for Paillier Cryptosystem to study its impact on
our computations. Keys were generated using Paillier-js NPM Package [7] written
in JavaScript language. The keys that were used are 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits
and are provided in tables 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.4, respectively. NIST recommends
2048-bit keys as the standard key size. Therefore, we use a 2048-bit key (Table 5.1.3)
in the next experiments. We used 10 organizations to jointly and securely compute
the mean value of their datasets. Organization variables are summarized in table
4.3.1.
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Organization A N
Organization 1 1000 250
Organization 2 2000 500
Organization 3 3000 750
Organization 4 4000 1000
Organization 5 5000 1250
Organization 6 6000 1500
Organization 7 7000 1750
Organization 8 8000 2000
Organization 9 9000 2250
Organization 10 10000 2500
Table 4.3.1: Mean Variables Used for Key Size Experiments
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Table 4.3.2 shows the results. A summary of the results is provided in table 4.3.3 and
illustrated in figures 4.3.2 and 4.3.1.
Table 4.3.2: Blockchain Response Time based on Size of Key
Request Number 512-Bit Key 1024-Bit Key 2048-Bit Key 4096-Bit Key
1 2.74s 2.88s 3.24s 4.38s
2 2.79s 2.99s 3.26s 4.57s
3 2.72s 2.89s 3.39s 4.44s
4 2.79s 2.85s 3.21s 4.38s
5 2.73s 2.83s 3.23s 4.42s
6 2.71s 2.85s 3.31s 4.27s
7 2.79s 2.81s 3.13s 4.38s
8 2.81s 2.82s 3.25s 4.21s
9 2.67s 2.80s 3.28s 4.19s
10 2.83s 2.82s 3.06s 4.38s





Table 4.3.3: Response Time Results of Various Key Sizes
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Fig. 4.3.1: Response Time (s) based on Key Size (Bit)
Fig. 4.3.2: Average Response Time based on Key Size
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4.3.2 Statistical Analysis Method
Statistical functions have different numbers of variables in our proposed method.
The purpose of this experiment is to find the impact of increasing variables on the
performance. We compare the proposed secure count, mean, and variance methods
that have one, two, and three variables, respectively.




1 4 8 2
2 8 16 4
3 12 24 6
4 16 32 8
5 20 40 10
6 24 48 12
7 28 56 14
8 32 64 16
9 36 72 18
10 40 80 20
Table 4.3.4: Variables used for SMC
For each number of variables, we sent 10 requests to the blockchain network. The
results are shown in table 4.3.5 and illustrated in figure 4.3.3 and figure 4.3.4.
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Request 1-Variable 2-Variables 3-Variables
1 2.74 3.08 3.04
2 2.59 2.95 3.23
3 2.57 2.90 3.09
4 2.53 2.93 3.16
5 2.71 2.91 3.14
6 2.81 2.99 3.21
7 2.60 2.97 3.29
8 2.75 2.99 3.20
9 2.56 3.12 3.19
10 2.60 2.78 3.43
Table 4.3.5: Response Time (s) based on Number of Variables
Fig. 4.3.3: Response Time based on Number of Variables
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Fig. 4.3.4: Average Response Time based on Number of Variables
4.3.3 Request Type
Two types of HTTP requests, GET and POST, were used to communicate with the
blockchain network. GET requests retrieve data from the blockchain, and POST
requests submit transactions to the blockchain network. Nodes in a Hyperledger
Fabric network store the latest value of variables in a separate database called State
Database. GET requests are expected to operate faster since they make peer nodes
to retrieve data from their local state database. Thus, we assume that the number
of nodes does not have any impact on the latency for GET requests. Opposite to
GET requests, POST requests are used to submit transactions to change the state
of variables in blockchain, and these transactions need to go through a consensus
process among the peer nodes, which take a longer time to execute [10].
In this experiment, we aim to find the time difference between regular GET and
POST requests in the deployed blockchain network. A summary of the experiment
variables and their values is shown in Table 4.3.6.
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Table 4.3.6: Request Type Experiment Variables Summary












Table 4.3.7: Response Time (s) based on Request Type
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Fig. 4.3.5: Response Time based on Request Type
Fig. 4.3.6: Average Response Time based on Request Type
4.3.4 Number of Organizations
The number of participating organizations in a secure multiparty computation is
another important variable that impacts the number of required calculations.
In this experiment, we used our model with different numbers of participating
organizations. The variables for this experiment are summarized in table 4.3.8.
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Independent Variables Dependent Variable
Number of Organizations
Response Time
10, 20, 30, 40, 50
Table 4.3.8: Request Type Experiment Variables Summary
The results for this experiment are shown in table 4.3.9, and illustrated in figure 4.3.7
and figure 4.3.8.
Organizations 10 20 30 40 50
Request 1 3.11 3.72 4.74 5.48 5.99
Request 2 3.06 3.67 5.4 5 5.59
Request 3 2.98 3.77 4.4 5.22 5.77
Request 4 4.03 3.76 4.41 5.29 5.79
Request 5 3.06 3.69 4.65 5.19 5.76
Request 6 3.02 3.7 4.41 5.08 5.89
Request 7 3.02 3.9 4.4 5.07 7.14
Request 8 3.04 3.75 3.31 5.18 6.06
Request 9 3.14 3.86 4.22 5.38 6
Request 10 3.2 4.8 4.46 5.05 7.27
Table 4.3.9: Response Time (s) based on Number of Organizations
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Fig. 4.3.7: Response Time based on Number of Organizations




In this paper, we discussed the important usages of electronic health data, from
education and regulation to public health. We examined the major obstacles to
efficiently use these important data, which roots in strict privacy acts and isolated
data silos. In this work, we proposed a novel solution for performing statistical
analysis on private health data. We aimed to increase the accuracy of data analysis
protocols while preserving the privacy of patients. To achieve this goal, we leveraged
the blockchain technology and the Paillier encryption algorithm. Smart contracts
were used to carry out mathematical operations on the encrypted records in a secure
manner. We were able to successfully deploy the proposed scheme on the Hyperledger
Fabric permissioned and consortium blockchain platform. Our experimental results
showed the feasibility of this method with an average of 3 seconds processing time for
10 organizations that securely compute a regular mean statistical method. We also
tested our method with both the standard 2048 key size and a larger 4098 key size.
The 4098 key size increased the response time by 1.2 seconds. However, this overhead
highly depends on the computation power of the blockchain nodes and is expected to
decrease as computers become more powerful.
5.1 Future Work
Our method was tested on a single blockchain node. To precisely examine the scala-
bility of this method, a larger environment would be preferable. As part of our future




Another area for efficiency improvement is detaching the external libraries from the
smart contracts. When data are encrypted using a standard 2048 key size in a Paillier
cryptosystem, they would have a length of around 1233 digits; however, the JavaScript
language, which is one of the languages for writing smart contracts in Hyperledger
Fabric, does not have native support for such big integers. Consequently, we needed
to add the Big-integer JavaScript library [8], which adds big integers support to the
language, to our smart contracts. As the results of our experiments show, the main
bottleneck of our proposed method is the data aggregation part, which is carried
out by the smart contracts. Therefore, we expect that by detaching the Big-integer
library from our smart contracts and by using a native approach, we can increase
the computation speed and achieve a better result. The development such a native
approach is another part of our future works.
Moreover, We adapted four statistical methods, which are count, mean, variance,
and skewness, in our proposed framework to demonstrate its feasibility. Adaptation
of more secure statistical methods is moreover in our future plans to improve this
research.
Furthermore, the proposed method only supports simple arithmetic addition op-
erator, through Paillier cryptosystem, that limits its ability to calculate more sophis-
ticated queries that require either multiplication or comparison of values. Algorithms
like ElGamal [26] and Goldwasser-Micali (GM) [30] can be adapted to add arithmetic
multiplication and XOR operators to overcome this limitation.
Lastly, scalability is a known problem of blockchain applications [35] that is still an
open problem, and under research by the time of writing this thesis. This limitation
also applies to our proposed protocol, and solutions for further improvements of the
scalability is another future plan of this thesis.
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APPENDICES
This chapter contains additional information, tables, and figures.
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